Publications

Research

State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity Rights

Journal of Human Rights, Volume 8, Number 4, 2009, 283 - 300.

Abstract | PDF | Replication Materials
Why do states violate personal integrity rights? One of the most robust empirical observations is that democratic states do not repress or violate these rights. Yet, some democracies respect rights while others do not. To address this puzzle, I offer a state capacity based explanation for human rights violations. I argue that insecure leaders, in both democracies and autocracies, are more likely to violate rights in an attempt to cling to power. Results from a series of econometric models support a state-centric view of human rights violations.

Partisanship and Policy Choice

(with Peter Kingstone), Political Research Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 1,
March 2009, 29 - 41.

Abstract | PDF | Replication Materials
Leftists seem to be on the rise in Latin America,but it is unclear to what extent this impacts policy. Thus,a crucial question hangs over this apparent “shift”in regional preferences: does the left have any real options to offer? Or in Latin America in an age of globalization, “what’s left for the left?”The contending perspectives are compared, and then the evidence is evaluated using a series of econometric models. In sum, no discernible policy differences between the left and the rest were found. In the conclusion, the implications of this result for Latin American democracy are discussed.

Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency

(with Mike Findley), Civil Wars, Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2007, 378 - 401.

Abstract | PDF | Replication Materials
From as early as the Roman Empire to the present day, governments have grappled with how best to respond to political violence from organized insurgent groups. In response to insurgent groups, some governments have emphasized a direct military response or what is often called ‘attrition’. Other states have stressed a softer, political strategy or what is often called the ‘hearts and minds’ approach. Either approach places thepopulation at the center of a struggle between the government and violent dissidents. Despite numerous works emphasizing either ‘attrition’ or ‘hearts andminds’, few theoretical studies have attempted to compare their relative success. Using an agent-based computational model, we examine which approach is more successful at quelling insurgencies and find that a hearts and minds approach is superior to an attrition strategy. We illustrate the model with insights from the Iraqi insurgency and, moregenerally, themodel has implications for other insurgencies, such as in Chechnya.

Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes and the Prisoner's Dilemma

(with Brian Urlacher), International Interactions, Volume 33 Issue 1, January 2007, 51-73.

Abstract | PDF | Replication Materials

One of the most important debates in the field of international relations is over the effect of regime type on militarized conflict. This debate, however, has rarely extended to how regime type influences other aspects of foreign policy. Using a computer simulated intergroup prisoner’s dilemma, we investigate whether democratic decisionmaking groups are more cooperative than authoritarian decisionmaking groups. We argue that differences between cooperation tendencies of groups can be explained by the structure of the decision process. Repeated simulations show that democracies tend to be more consistent in their decisions in comparison to authoritarian groups. Implications for international relations theory and policy are discussed.

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Teaching/Simulations

Simulating Terror: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling,
and Strategic Behavior

(with David Siegel), PS: Political Science & Politics, Volume 42, Number 4, October 2009, 765 - 771.

Abstract | PDF | Materials
We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and
counter-terrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision-making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting, as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.

Simulating Two-Level Negotiations

International Studies Perspectives, Volume 7, Issue 1, February 2006, 77-82.

Abstract | PDF | Materials
International negotiations can be modeled as a two-level process that involves competing interests within and between groups. This modified simulation of the classic prisoner’s dilemma introduces students to the negotiation process and challenges them to consider how different de cision structures can affect outcomes. Students fill both leadership and negotiation roles and gain an active learning experience that exposes them to important international relations concepts. All of the instructions, handouts, and materials are included to provide instructors of international relations or comparative politics with a resource that can be utilized with groups of varying size, ability, and composition.


	Home CV Research -Interests -Publications -Working Papers -Data Teaching -Philosophy -Interests -Courses -Simulations			Publications Research State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity Rights Journal of Human Rights, Volume 8, Number 4, 2009, 283 - 300. Abstract \| PDF \| Replication Materials Why do states violate personal integrity rights? One of the most robust empirical observations is that democratic states do not repress or violate these rights. Yet, some democracies respect rights while others do not. To address this puzzle, I offer a state capacity based explanation for human rights violations. I argue that insecure leaders, in both democracies and autocracies, are more likely to violate rights in an attempt to cling to power. Results from a series of econometric models support a state-centric view of human rights violations. Partisanship and Policy Choice (with Peter Kingstone), Political Research Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 1, March 2009, 29 - 41. Abstract \| PDF \| Replication Materials Leftists seem to be on the rise in Latin America,but it is unclear to what extent this impacts policy. Thus,a crucial question hangs over this apparent “shift”in regional preferences: does the left have any real options to offer? Or in Latin America in an age of globalization, “what’s left for the left?”The contending perspectives are compared, and then the evidence is evaluated using a series of econometric models. In sum, no discernible policy differences between the left and the rest were found. In the conclusion, the implications of this result for Latin American democracy are discussed. Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency (with Mike Findley), Civil Wars, Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2007, 378 - 401. Abstract \| PDF \| Replication Materials From as early as the Roman Empire to the present day, governments have grappled with how best to respond to political violence from organized insurgent groups. In response to insurgent groups, some governments have emphasized a direct military response or what is often called ‘attrition’. Other states have stressed a softer, political strategy or what is often called the ‘hearts and minds’ approach. Either approach places thepopulation at the center of a struggle between the government and violent dissidents. Despite numerous works emphasizing either ‘attrition’ or ‘hearts andminds’, few theoretical studies have attempted to compare their relative success. Using an agent-based computational model, we examine which approach is more successful at quelling insurgencies and find that a hearts and minds approach is superior to an attrition strategy. We illustrate the model with insights from the Iraqi insurgency and, moregenerally, themodel has implications for other insurgencies, such as in Chechnya. Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes and the Prisoner's Dilemma (with Brian Urlacher), International Interactions, Volume 33 Issue 1, January 2007, 51-73. Abstract \| PDF \| Replication Materials One of the most important debates in the field of international relations is over the effect of regime type on militarized conflict. This debate, however, has rarely extended to how regime type influences other aspects of foreign policy. Using a computer simulated intergroup prisoner’s dilemma, we investigate whether democratic decisionmaking groups are more cooperative than authoritarian decisionmaking groups. We argue that differences between cooperation tendencies of groups can be explained by the structure of the decision process. Repeated simulations show that democracies tend to be more consistent in their decisions in comparison to authoritarian groups. Implications for international relations theory and policy are discussed. ____________________________________________________ Teaching/Simulations Simulating Terror: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior (with David Siegel), PS: Political Science & Politics, Volume 42, Number 4, October 2009, 765 - 771. Abstract \| PDF \| Materials We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision-making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting, as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations. Simulating Two-Level Negotiations International Studies Perspectives, Volume 7, Issue 1, February 2006, 77-82. Abstract \| PDF \| Materials International negotiations can be modeled as a two-level process that involves competing interests within and between groups. This modified simulation of the classic prisoner’s dilemma introduces students to the negotiation process and challenges them to consider how different de cision structures can affect outcomes. Students fill both leadership and negotiation roles and gain an active learning experience that exposes them to important international relations concepts. All of the instructions, handouts, and materials are included to provide instructors of international relations or comparative politics with a resource that can be utilized with groups of varying size, ability, and composition.