The Aporia of Affection in Husserl’s *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*

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Husserl defines affection in the *Analyses*\(^1\) as "the allure given to consciousness, the particular pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego."\(^2\) That something becomes prominent for the ego implies that the object exerts a kind of 'pull' upon the ego, a demanding of egoic attention. This affective pull is relative in force, such that the same object can be experienced in varying modes of prominence and affective relief depending upon bodily comportment, egoic attentiveness, etc. The phenomenon of affection allows Husserl to describe the genesis of association in terms of the lawful, regular exertions of affection upon the ego, prompting (for example) the reproduction of remembered pasts in retention on a purely passive level. Affection thus provides Husserl a non-Humean mechanism for the lawful phenomenon of association.

In this light, we can see that affection plays a crucial role in the passive phenomenon of association and thereby in the constitution of sense. The precise role played by affection, however, remains quite problematic in the *Analyses*. Husserl is rather unclear on this point, and two of the leading commentators on the *Analyses*, Anthony Steinbock and Bruce Bégout, offer opposing viewpoints. Is affection the precondition for the constitution of any sense unity, as Steinbock suggests, or is it the

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\(^2\) XI 148. ACPAS 196.
case that Husserl asserts the primacy of affection against all phenomenological evidence, as Bégout has it? In attempting to grasp the role played by affection in the constitution of sense, we will adjudicate this ‘dispute’ through a careful reading of both Steinbock and Bégout in light of Husserl’s own assertions. Given the difficulties in his account, Husserl’s analysis of affection and sense constitution is ultimately found problematic, even if read in the ‘best case’ scenario sketched by Steinbock. However, the aporia of affection is not without value, as we will see at the end of this paper.

I

Although Anthony Steinbock’s *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* is not predominantly concerned with the issue of affection as it arises in the *Analyses*, Steinbock does offer a brief discussion of the role played by affection in sense constitution. As he notes, the 'guiding question of affection' can be outlined as follows:

When something becomes prominent for me, is it there in its prominence, awaiting, 'neutrally,' my affirmation or selection; or does it already exercise some influence on me, luring me to take it up? Or again, are there unities of sense that could come into being independently of affection if the 'relevant conditions' of becoming a unity are fulfilled (e.g. concrescence, contrast, etc.); or does a unity of sense, even the most elementary phase of the living present, co-originate with affection in order to be precisely this sense-unity? Put more simply, does affective force

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presuppose prominence, or does prominence presuppose affective force

(XI 149, 153, 161, 165)?

Steinbock's answer is that, ultimately, the most primordial levels of sense constitution are already charged with affective force, so that even the lowest levels of passive synthesis depend upon affection as their catalyst. In order to make his case, especially in light of the manner in which something becomes prominent, ‘achieves’ its being-in-relief, Steinbock follows Husserl in distinguishing between two different levels of passivity – the pregiven and the given. Implicit in this distinction is the idea that all sense unities or objectlike formations are always already charged with affective force. In light of the fact that not all of these ‘affective somethings’ come into relief for the ego, however, there must be some kind of differentiation posed between that which is affectively charged but not thematized through egoic attention, and that which is attended to by the ego through its prominence and affective force. The pregiven and given are not different in kind, but rather imply a gradation or relativity of affection, such that objects and objectlike formations exert their pull on the ego with relative force. The ego becomes attentive to a prominence only when the affective tendency of the sense unity in some way exerts its pull on the ego.

If the difference in affective force between the pregiven and the given is merely one of grade, then, as Steinbock correctly notes, there can be no truly neutral objects – every object or objectlike formation must, to some degree, exert some affective tendency

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4 Steinbock, 153.
5 As Steinbock describes this distinction, “something constituted is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective force; it is given when the ego turns toward the object in an attitude of interest or in an attentive manner.” (Steinbock, 154. cf. XI 162, ACPAS 210, where Husserl says that “any kind of constituted sense is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the allure and has turned towards it attentively, laying hold of it.”)
6 Steinbock, 154.
on the ego, and thus must be affective to a greater or lesser extent. There can be no ‘pure affective nothing,’ as Husserl puts it, for it seems incomprehensible that “something which was not there at all for the ego… should become an active something for the first time.” If affection is to play a role in prominence in the least, everything must possess some affective charge to a varying degree.

Steinbock’s account thus far speaks to the role played by affection in prominence and being-in-relief, where the coming to prominence of something depends upon its being affectively charged and thereby compelling egoic attention. But, delving more deeply into passivity, how does affection operate in the constitution of sense and the formation of sense unities? Given that sense unities have meaning for consciousness only insofar as they are attended to on some level, or that they emerge from the horizontal background of intentionality solely due to the affective force they exert, what role does affection then play in the constitution of sense?

In a way, Husserl’s account of the role played by affection is circular: as Steinbock notes, “if sense constitution did presuppose affection, would not the very constitution of sense somehow presuppose, paradoxically, that sense was already constituted so that it could exert an affective force on me in order to be constituted?” If our analysis remains strictly within a so-called ‘Cartesian’ paradigm of sense constitution, where the form of time consciousness is ‘overlaid’ onto the passing stream of impressional nows and hyletic data, Steinbock is quick to say, the Husserlian account

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7 XI 163. ACPAS 211.
8 If something is not prominent and does not demand egoic attention, this does not mean that it is affectively null; rather, something becomes prominent through a modification of affective force, so that some prominence affectively awakens something else – another element of the sense field, or perhaps the reproduction of a presentified past or future – through its allure, thereby fulfilling a synthesis of association between two affectively charged sense unities.
9 Steinbock, 154.
of affection does seem circular indeed. However, transitioning to a genetic account of perception and passivity allows us to grasp the manner in which the form/content distinction is wholly undercut in the Analyses, driving affective force deep into the depths of primordial time constitution. Both retention and protention depend upon the affective awakening of presentified elements of horizontal intentionality in the streaming progression of primordial time consciousness and sense constitution. Without affection – without something being prominent for the ego and affecting its allure on the ego – it is difficult to see how association gets off the ground. Affection must then be co-operative or co-extensive with primordial time consciousness in the propagation of sense.

This is why Husserl says that “it is.. quite probable that affection already plays its essential role in the constitution of all objectlike formations such that there would be no objects at all and no present articulated with objects.” Steinbock turns to this passage in the Analyses to point out the absolutely fundamental role played by affection in the constitution of sense. The most passive, primordial levels of sense constitution are already shot through with the competing pulls of affective forces, and even at this most basic constitutive level, according to Steinbock, we find a mechanism of selectivity and discrimination operative in the transition from pregiven objectlike formations to given, prominent objects. The intentional relation between embodied ego and perceptual field leads to the selective constitution of prominent objects on the basis of specific egoic criteria and differentiation. Specific affections receive attention due to the specific historical, kinaesthetic and axiological constitution of the embodied subject, and the

10 ibid.
11 On the issue of the ‘form/content’ distinction and its disintegration, see Nuki. For a more general discussion of the relation between affection and time consciousness, see Welton.
12 XI 164. ACPAS 213.
13 Steinbock, 156.
gradation or relativity of affective force within a sense field depends upon the intentional stance of the particular subject. Sense constitution is accordingly never merely neutral; it is always already shot through with affect, and constitution itself is grounded in the gradation of affective force within the perceptual field.

II

Although Husserl seems to offer a clear account of the role played by affection in prominence and sense constitution, a close reading of the pivotal texts reveals a more complex situation. Taking §34 of the Analyses as the central text in interpreting Husserl’s understanding of affection, Bruce Bégout correctly points out that Husserl’s text winds through numerous interpretative by-ways and cul-de-sacs, often reversing course and contradicting itself. Bégout’s contention is that Husserl ends up positing the primacy of affection in constitutive processes over and against the phenomenological evidence for such an assertion. While he does not directly contradict Steinbock’s findings, given his recognition of the homogeneity between the positions of Husserl and Steinbock on this point, Bégout’s work puts Husserl’s (and Steinbock’s) findings into question.

Bégout begins by describing a vicious circle of passivity and affection in much the same way as Steinbock did above; in fact, he even quotes Steinbock’s passage on circularity previously discussed, and sums up his question in the following way: “which is first, affection or the formation of unity?”

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14 Bégout, 191.
unification would only intervene with the contestations of real affections.”

Although he deems this tentative assertion to be ‘surprising,’ Bégout attempts to think through the stakes of Husserl’s thought via the first distinction Husserl draws between two levels of the formation of unity – those “unconditionally necessary fusions” that emerge prior to the action of affection, and the “fusions or formations of unity that are owing first to affection.”

On this account, the first level of fusion would only concern the temporal character of the living present, while the second, affective fusions would be applicable to the already-constituted unities in the various perceptual fields. This distinction would seem to imply that there can be a pre-affective level of the unification of sense, thereby undercutting the thesis that affection is fundamental to the constitution of sense. As Bégout has it, “the original interpretation of affection as a simple putting into relation of hyletic unities and the receptive ego is thus confirmed; ‘affection does not always make the relationships that are grounding in the particularity of the contents.’”

There is then a hard and fast difference between the pre-affective and affective levels of the passive propagation of sense.

Nonetheless, Husserl returns to the thesis of the primacy of affection as primordial within the passive sphere. As Husserl says, “perhaps it is so that initially every concrete, particular constituted thing, everything that is constituted in relief for itself and not constituted first through affection, necessarily exercises an affection to some degree or other.”

On this reading, the associative fusions carried out on the ‘pre-

15 ibid.
16 Bégout, 192. op. cit. XI 159-60, ACPAS 207-8.
17 Bégout, 192. op. cit. XI 160, ACPAS 208.
18 XI 161, ACPAS 209.
affective’ level would require the ‘joining force’\textsuperscript{19} of affection to effect the associative syntheses. The problem of circularity here begins to come into relief – which strand of Husserl’s analysis is ultimately correct, or is the knot of affection and sense constitution truly Gordian? Husserl himself makes matters worse when he immediately denies what he has just said:

Upon a closer inspection of the possible interpretations we find what we have just uttered to be untenable. The division that is made here between the constitution of objects of a higher level as opposed to the objects that are constituted in an original singularity is unjustified because it is incomprehensible that fusion should first be generated through the unity of affection.\textsuperscript{20}

The point here seems to be that the lower level of passive fusion must be pre-affective, insofar as this level deals merely with the temporal form and ordering of the stream of hyletic data. Affection adds nothing to the account, and as Bégout writes in a footnote, “it is indeed, declares Husserl, quite incomprehensible to attribute to associative fusions constitutive of the first objectlike formations any affection whatsoever, because these operations would not be ‘comprehensible in themselves.’ In this, the introduction of affective processes would not be of any explanatory help.”\textsuperscript{21} In this case, on Bégout’s account, Husserl returns to his initial conclusions, where the pre-affective constitution of objectlike formations would be the precondition for the propagation of affection via affective awakening. The pre-affective syntheses must have ‘done their work’ prior to

\textsuperscript{19} Bégout, 193.
\textsuperscript{20} XI 161, ACPAS 209.
\textsuperscript{21} Bégout, 193, n.9. cf. XI 162.
the affective emergence of the prominent or the affective allure which effects an awakening.

Husserl’s problem, it seems, is to bring together these two strands of his analysis, and according to Bégout, he does so through recourse to the distinction between the pre-given and the given which is so central to Steinbock’s reading. Bégout writes that “Husserl suggests that whereas all originary hyletic unities are first constituted ‘for themselves,’ on a preaffective level… they can in fact have value ‘for the ego,’ and this precisely in and through the gradations of affection.”

In this rendering of the role of affectivity in sense constitution, Husserl takes affection to be operative in the deepest levels of passive constitution. The first level of the streaming hyletic data would not be affectively neutral or non-affective, but rather, the ego would remain ‘unconscious’ as regards the affective force of the pre-given according to the relative gradation of affective force. The pre-affective or pre-given would then, as Bégout notes, “consist in a non-experienced or merely potential affectivity… [and] the transition from the pre-affective to the affective would be one of a ‘soft transition’ from a kat’auto affectivity to a pro émas affectivity.”

It is with good reason, according to Bégout, that Husserl deems this final introduction of affectivity into originary passivity to be ‘risky.’ Bégout offers two specific problems which highlight this risk. First, as he says, “all affections are not in the

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22 Bégout, 194.
23 The theme of the unconscious in the Analyses and its possible relation to a Freudian or psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious has recently been taken up in a number of articles. Most notably, Aaron Mishara (“Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious.” Husserl Studies 7: 29-58, 1990), Talia Welsh (“The Retentional and the Repressed: Does Freud’s Concept of the Unconscious Threaten Husserlian Phenomenology?” Human Studies 25: 165-183, 2002), and Rudolf Bernet (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 327-351, 2002) have explored various facets of this relation.
24 Bégout, 194.
25 XI 163. ACPAS 211.
first place immediately perceptible for the ego. There are constituted unities that are not affective...” 26 Bégout here is concerned with the sense unity as it is given ‘for the ego,’ such that certain unities do indeed appear to be affectively neutral for the object. But here Bégout seems to miss precisely the point that he attributes to Husserl – the ‘in-itself’ of the sense unity or object can appear as affectively neutral insofar as other competing affections push it into the background, turning egoic attention away from it. It is not necessarily the case that there would be constituted unities that are not affective insofar as these ‘neutral’ unities always contain the possibility of becoming prominent for the ego, and thereby exerting their latent ‘pull’ upon egoic attentiveness. Bégout offers a similar concern with his second problem, where it would appear that “the pre-affective domain can have value outside of all affective relation to an ego.”27 If Husserl were only concerned with the manner in which sense unities appear ‘for the ego,’ we might think Bégout to have raised a valid concern at this point. However, as a recent paper by Dan Zahavi on ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’ underscores, Husserlian phenomenology can be understood as engaging issues of both meaning and being,28 or both the ‘for the ego’ and the ‘in-itself’ of sense unities. It is not clear, given Husserl’s repeated discussion of the ‘in-itself,’ that the actual materiality of the stream of hyletic data does not contribute to affective awakening and becoming-prominent. In other words, it is not clear that Bégout’s concern regarding the non-egoically constituted affectivity of some object or objectlike formation would be problematic in the least within Husserl’s account.

Whether we take Husserl to embrace or deny the possibility of a pre-affective level within passive syntheses, or make a corresponding claim regarding an operative

26 Bégout, 194.
27 ibid.
28 Zahavi, 9.
affectivity within the innermost depths of primordial sense constitution, Bégout’s main concern seems to revolve around the apparent circularity both possibilities entail. It is this issue that, in Bégout’s account, ‘poisons the Analyses.’

He understands the positing of either a pre-affective sphere of passivity or an affectivity operative in the most passive levels of intentional consciousness to each present certain irresolvable difficulties within a properly transcendental-phenomenological account of the passive propagation of sense. As Bégout understands it, Husserl’s conclusion regarding an operative affectivity as essential within all formation of unity presents a certain ‘advantage’ – it allows Husserl to construct a model of passive modes of intentionality in which all levels are modes of egoic participation and activity. The ego is not ‘cut out’ of the passive strata of consciousness, but rather, is always already operative through via affection. Even the most primal elements of time consciousness are not purely passive, but are shot through with the sediments of egoic activity, past and present.

We have seen, through a consideration of the work of both Steinbock and Bégout, that in the end Steinbock’s insistence upon an operative affectivity within passive constitution represents Husserl’s own conclusions on the matter. However, we have also seen, through a close reading of Bégout’s analysis of §34 of the Analyses, that Husserl does indeed come to his conclusion through a kind of ‘decision,’ a decision to prioritize affection within the passive constitution of sense against much of the phenomenological evidence (even if we might not ultimately agree with Bégout’s understanding of this decision), and that the spectre of circularity regarding affection and sense constitution

29 Bégout, 195.
30 Bégout, 195f.
31 Bégout, 195.
32 For example, protention can adequately be understood to rely upon retention and secondary memory for its contents.
remains, hovering within the text. It remains for us to attempt to briefly tease out some possible conclusions regarding affection in the *Analyses*, and perhaps more importantly, to point out one possible interpretation of this Husserlian ‘aporia’ which neither Husserl, Steinbock, nor Bégout entertain.

III

On the whole, according to our analysis, the ‘debate’ between Anthony Steinbock and Bruce Bégout must be adjudicated in Steinbock’s favor, insofar as his analysis of the primacy of affection in *Home and Beyond* does seem to cohere with the main thrust of Husserl’s own musings. But in raising the supposed problem of circularity in the *Analyses*, Bégout does us a valuable service: he forces us to look for alternative accounts of the role played by affectivity within sense constitution, and for his part, offers us one such possibility. Turning to an appendix to the *Analyses* for his inspiration, Bégout suggests that a properly thematized concept of an originary instinct would provide the ‘impetus’ to the various pre-affective objectlike formations and synthesize them into coherent, affective unities. While Husserl himself dismisses this possibility rather quickly, 33 Bégout nonetheless believes that this notion of instinct might solve our problem.

Before all grasping by the ego, instinct, understood in this case as ‘a kind of anamnesis and as a kind of obscure background apperception,’ 34 would unify the various affective forces, so that they would constitute between them a real connection of ‘resonance,’ and would create a sort of affectively concordant community. It’s thanks to this affective instinct

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33 See Appendix 21 (XI 417f., ACPAS 520f.) for Husserl’s discussion.
34 [XI, 418. ACPAS, 521.]
whose inherent intention is directed ‘towards everything’ (vers le tout) and towards the resulting unity that Husserl can legitimately now speak of a ‘synthetic unity of affection’ without the risk of falling back into the synthetic circle of the preaffective and the affective. In making itself instinctive, affection would recover a power of synthesis that the simple process of excitation would not give it.\textsuperscript{35}

Given Husserl’s quick dismissal of instinct as operative in this way, we might dismiss Bégout’s claim with equal speed. But given the repeated emphasis Husserl places upon the relation between theoretical and practical reason, and the ‘striving’ peculiar to predicative judging,\textsuperscript{36} we perhaps should not dismiss Bégout’s idea so easily.

Nonetheless, it seems here that the introduction of instinct into the passive levels of sense constitution does little to alter our understanding of the role played by affection in the Analyses. In the first place, Bégout’s instinctive binding, while non-egoic, still would seem to rely upon the affective force of the pre-given as prompting instinctual synthesis and ‘attention.’ Additionally, if this affective instinct is truly directed towards everything, a certain gradation of affective force and affective relief would appear to remain in play, else the affective instinct would necessarily be selective to the point of the necessary exclusion of any number of sense unities. While an interesting alternative, and one worthy of study (especially in light of Nam-in Lee’s pioneering studies on instinct in Husserl), it does not initially seem as if it would solve the problem of circularity that is so problematic for Bégout.

\textsuperscript{35} Bégout, 197-8.
\textsuperscript{36} See, for example, Husserl’s discussion of questioning at XI 62f, ACPAS 102f.
Perhaps the most interesting consequence of Husserl’s analysis of affection in the *Analyses* is that the aporia of affection and sense constitution could be seen as *irresolvable*. That is to say, the apparent circularity of affection and sense constitution reveals one of the limits of genetic method and, more broadly, phenomenological inquiry. If we retain a notion of an intentional relation in which, as Bégout suggests, the activity of the ego functions to some degree even within the depths of passive constitution, affection remains a problem in Husserl’s analysis. But if we return to the phenomenon of affection as it gives itself in experience, perhaps another interpretation is in order.

Recall Husserl’s most basic formulation of affectivity: affection is “the allure given to consciousness, the particular pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego.” On Husserl’s account, the affectively charged prominence of something depends upon the relation between the hyletic data and the active ego; something in the perceptual field exerts an affective allure upon the ego, ‘pulling’ the ego to attend to it. In this way, Husserl should be seen to be working against the merely ‘associative’ or habitual model of empirical association expounded, for example, by David Hume. One might even describe Husserl’s account of association and affection as a ‘superior empiricism,’ one which is able to account for the manner in which disparate elements of any sense field are bound together according to lawful, genetic regularities. But it seems as if we might turn towards an empiricism which is *more superior yet* – perhaps a ‘transcendental empiricism?’

Any characterizations of this transcendental empiricism are far beyond the scope of this paper. But let me point out one site in particular for investigation – the work of

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37 XI 148. ACPAS 196.
Emmanuel Levinas. As a number of scholars have recently argued, it is possible, and perhaps necessary, to read Levinas’ thought in terms of its confrontation with phenomenology, and specifically in terms of its confrontation with Husserl. Nowhere is this more evident than in the opening pages of his last major work, *Otherwise than Being*. In these pages, Levinas attempts to ‘burrow beneath’ the passive syntheses of time-consciousness in Husserlian phenomenology, with the interest of breaking through the kind of aporia that has been described in this paper. As he writes,

> We must go back to ... the signification beyond or on the hither side of the comprehending activity or passivity in being, the said, the logos and the amphibology of being and entities. The ‘reduction’ is made in this movement. It involves a positive phase: to show the signification proper to the saying on the hither side of the thematization of the said.

In other words, according to Levinas, there is some alterity (the ‘saying’) on the hither side of every *Erlebnis* (the ‘said’). Husserlian phenomenology cannot account for this diachrony, this an-archic *Ur-impression*, no matter the depths to which Husserl attempts to interrogate passive synthesis or the passive subject. Such a rupture of the subject provides Levinas the means to introduce his notion of an infinite transcendence at the heart of the ego, the trauma of the encounter with the Other, and his account of substitution.

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40 I borrow this most apt phrase from a recent essay by Bettina Bergo. (Bergo, Bettina. ‘Ontology, Transcendence, and Immanence in Emmanuel Levinas’s Philosophy.’ *Research in Phenomenology*, 35, 2005. 141-177.)

41 OBBE, 43/74.
If the aporia of affection is ultimately irresolvable, might not the Levinasian critique of Husserl offer us a solution? As we have seen, Husserl attempts to drive affection deep into the most passive levels of time-consciousness and sense constitution. As we have also seen, his account of the role played by affection is problematic at best. Might Husserl’s account of affection require its being articulated in terms of a Levinasian rendering of alterity? Such questions lead beyond the work presented here. However, they do point to the way in which affection may serve as a ‘limit-phenomenon’ in Husserl’s phenomenology.

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Works Cited


